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In an area, such as this, where commercial practice has so changed in the last
ten or fifteen years, and where there is such a paucity of judicial pronouncement,
one cannot but think that it would have served his purposes better to have
eschewed purely academic discussion wherever possible. No doubt Mr. Megrah
felt constrained by his position as editor to devote some time to such matters,
though I for one am convinced that it is about time that the old jurisprudential
debate as to the question of consideration between issuing bank and seller was
abandoned, and Lord Mansfield's original diagnosis that no consideration is, in
fact, present is accepted as being correct.22 It is inconceivable that any British
bank would today ever raise this as a defense23 and be upheld by an English
court.
There seems little doubt that were the original author alive today, he would
be more than satisfied with the efforts of his collaborator. The book, despite
some faults, stands as the best existing statement of English law on the matter
of bankers' commercial credits, and, as such, must be recognized as a significant
contribution to the legal literature on this topic.
No.mAN I. MILLER*
* Law and Behavioral Science Research Fellow, University of Chicago Law School.
2 Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663 (K.B., 1765). It has been accepted by the Uniform
Commercial Code § 5-105 (Final draft, 1956). Consult also, Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of
Contract 367 (4th ed., 1956). For the obvious objections to the author's agency theory, consult
Davis, op. cit. supra note 3, at 64, and Davis, The Relationship between Banker and Seller
under a Confirmed Credit, 52 L.Q.R. 225, 228 (1936). Compare also the General Provisions
to the Uniform Customs, op. cit. supra note 4.
23But, as the Law Revision Committee pointed out, the liquidator of a bank might very
well be obliged to raise such a technical defense. Sixth Report of the Law Revision Committee
upon the Doctrine of Consideration 28 (1937). But see Denning, L.J., in Smith v. River Doug-
las Catchment Board, [1949] 2 All E.R. 179, 188 (C.A.).
Some Problems of Proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation.
By Edmund M. Morgan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. Pp.
ix, 207. $3.50.
"[T]his lectureship will be made so honorable that nobody, however great,
or distinguished will willingly choose to decline your invitation" (p. ix). With
these words General Horace W. Carpentier launched the James S. Carpentier
Lectures at Columbia University in 1903. A glance at the names of those who
have since delivered the lectures will show that the aims of the founder have
been largely achieved. Professor Morgan's contribution, given in 1955, is
equal in standing and competency to the lectures of the past. Indeed, his lec-
tures are outstanding. Here, in 195 pages, is presented what might be termed
the philosophy of a man who has spent his life developing powerful arguments
for the reform of the law of evidence. The reviewer found the book both stimu-
lating and provocative.
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The aim of the work is to direct attention to the nature of the adversary
system in the common law world, and to recommend directions for reform. The
author devotes his opening lecture to the development of pleading. After re-
viewing the Year Books procedure, code and common law pleading, and the
mistakes of the Hilary rules, his final recommendation is the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Not only do the rules provide for disclosure of the materials relevant to the contro-
versy; they provide also for their use to eliminate fictitious issues. No longer can a
party hope to succeed by denial of an allegation which he knows to be true, because
he thinks his opponent will be unable to produce admissible evidence of its truth
[p. 33].
The second lecture deals with judicial notice. "A necessary deduction from
my position is that if a fact lies within the field of judicial notice, no evidence
tending to prove its contrary is admissible" (p. 48). A matter is either dis-
putable, in which case it lies within the field of evidence, or it is indisputable, in
which case it lies outside. In the author's opinion it would "destroy the very
reason for [the court's] existence" (p. 43) if the clearly indisputable could be
challenged in the court. It is to prevent this diversion and to expedite trials that
the court takes notice of indisputable matters of fact. As the author points out,
Thayer and Wigmore disagree with this viewpoint. Both claimed that the taking
of judicial notice is not a determination of indisputability, and that counter
evidence may still be introduced. Morgan challenges the authorities on which
Thayer and Wigmore relied, claiming that Thayer misread the cases and that
Wigmore quoted cases where "the matter as to which the evidence was offered
was either clearly without the realm of judicial notice or fell within that group
of situations where the indisputability of the matter was itself disputable" (p.
53).
The difficulty with Morgan's position is that it is largely academic to say that
a judicially noticed proposition is conclusively established, if the question of
disputability can be re-opened. As the author agrees, the controversy in the
majority of cases arises from disagreement between the parties as to whether the
questioned material is disputable or otherwise. Judicial notice may settle the
question for the trial, but appeal on the ground of disputability restores much
of the inconclusiveness which Morgan claims now exists in the right to challenge
judicially noticed material. A party who appeals from the taking of judicial
notice will, of course, ultimately challenge the fact asserted, but the appeal will
be limited to a claim of disputability. The appellate court will reverse if it finds
that the evidence does not sufficiently support the facts noticed, whereupon the
matter re-enters the boundaries of the law of evidence.
The author's third lecture deals with the functions of judge and jury. The
first part is concerned with the allocation and discharge of the burden of proof.
After distinguishing between the burden of producing evidence and the burden
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of persuasion, he discusses the effect of presumptions. Thayer himself supposed
that a presumption called for "such an amount of evidence" from the opponent
"as may render the view contended for rationally probable."' It seems, however,
that once one accepts the contention that mere evidence is all that is required to
balance the presumption, the rational significance of "presumption" is lost.
Apart from policy in a particular case, the very logical effect of "presumption"
is that rebutting evidence must establish the greater probability of the presumed
fact's non-existence. The distinction between the quantum of rebuttal evidence
rationally called for by the existence of any presumption, and the additional
amount of evidence required by a policy rule in a particular case is a line most
difficult to draw. Rationally, the mere existence of a presumption would appear
to require a standard of "greater probability," and to this standard of proof
policy may add. It therefore seems clear that the presumption puts upon the
party alleging the non-existence of the presumed fact both the burden of pro-
ducing evidence, and-to the extent of greater probability-the burden of
persuasion of its non-existence. If this is so, the burden of persuasion of the non-
existence of the particular presumed fact cannot shift.
It is surely indisputable that the burden of proof of the facts in issue, both
of producing evidence and persuading, cannot shift, while the tactical burden
of proof will shift from side to side as the argument progresses. In these circum-
stances it is not unlikely that the establishment of the existence or non-existence
of the subject-matter of certain facts will be first on one party, and then on the
other as the hearing advances; this effect being produced by the rational
processes of argument and the operation of presumptions. Such an occurrence,
however, would not appear to produce any shift in the burden of persuasion on
a particular presumption, though tactically the adducing of evidence sufficient
to rebut the presumption will throw the onus of argument on that issue back
upon the beneficiary of the presumption. The author's argument on page 80
appears to confuse these distinctions.
Contrary to Thayer's contention that a presumption carries only a compul-
sory tentative assumption, Morgan suggests that:
sensible procedure would require the abandonment of the Thayer doctrine as to pre-
sumptions and concede that the establishment of facts which create a presumption
does in some situations and should in most cases fix the burden of persuasion as Rule 14
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence provides [p. 81].
The constructive value of this lies in the fact that in connection with presump-
tions the court is dealing with three phenomena: substantive law, the ramifica-
tions of policy, and mere rational and commonplace inferences. In these cir-
cumstances, of course, the burden of persuasion of the non-existence of the
presumed fact will vary. In some cases it will be heavy, e.g., where a change of
status is involved, as with the presumption of legitimacy of a child born in
'Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 336 (1898).
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wedlock. In other cases it will be light, as, for example, where the deaths of
two persons apparently occur simultaneously, it is presumed that the older
person died first.
In continuing his discussion on the burden of persuasion, the author raises a
familiar problem. What language shall the judge use in describing to the jury
the extent to which they must be persuaded by the evidence? Every lawyer is
familiar with the civil charge of a "balance of probabilities," and with the
criminal charge "beyond reasonable doubt." But Morgan fears that the jury-
man translates these terms into others more familiar to himself, and that these
replacing terms do not carry exactly the same meaning to him as the one the
court wishes to convey.
In England this problem has recently been raised in connection with the
phrase "beyond reasonable doubt." In Regina v. Summers,$ 2 Lord Goddard, C.J.,
declared:
I have never yet heard any court give a real definition of what is a "reasonable doubt,"
and it would be very much better if that expression were not used. Whenever a court
attempts to explain what is meant by it, the explanation tends to result in confusion
rather than clarity. 3
Lord Goddard then suggested:
It is far better, instead of using the words "reasonable doubt" and then trying to
explain what is a reasonable doubt, to say to a jury: "You must not convict unless
you are satisfied by the evidence given by the prosecution that the offence has been
committed." The jury should be told that it is not for the prisoner to prove his inno-
cence, but for the prosecution to prove his guilt, and that it is their duty to regard the
evidence and see if it satisfies them so that they can feel sure, when they give their
verdict, that it is a right one.4
Considerable criticism of the word "satisfied" followed Regina v. Summers.
Three years later, in Regina v. Hepworth and Fearnley,5 counsel for the defense
stoutly argued before the Court of Criminal Appeal that the word satisfied made
no distinction between the civil and criminal standards of proof, and on these
grounds sought an acquittal. Lord Goddard, speaking again for the Court,
declared, "I confess that I have had some difficulty in understanding how
there are or can be two standards."6 Morgan's point appears well taken when
such phrases emanate from an appellate court.
The Lord Chief Justice also discussed the difficulty over the "reasonable
doubt" charge:
[I]t is very difficult to tell a jury what is a reasonable doubt. To tell a jury that it
must not be a fanciful doubt is something that is without any real guidance. To tell
them that a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as to cause them to hesitate in their own
2 1 A.E.R. 1059 (1952).
3 Ibid., at 1060.
Ibid., at 1060.
6 2 Q.B. 600 (1955). 6 Ibid., at 603.
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affairs never seems to me to convey any particular standard; one member of the jury
might say he would hesitate over something and another member might say that that
would not cause him to hesitate at all.7
Clearly this court will now lay stress on the over-all impression conveyed by a
summing-up, rather than on a close analysis of any particular phrase. Perhaps
this approach best satisfies Professor Morgan's contentions.
To conclude this lecture the author devotes his attention to rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, under which head he considers the situation where
competency, as well as relevancy, depends upon a preliminary fact. Under the
orthodox rule the judge rules on competency when the preliminary fact arises,
and if the dispute is resolved in favor of competency the same issue is later sub-
mitted to the jury. The author takes task with the usual explanations for
competency. Is the raison d'81re of the exclusion that truth be repressed because
of relationship, or that the alleged untrustworthiness of the witness' evidence
lowers its value? The first explanation goes to admissibility, the second to
weight. With Professor Morgan's own viewpoint-that the aim should be the
admissibility of all relevant evidence-most would agree, particularly on the
present state of confused justifications for various types of withheld evidence.
On all standards, the author feels that since under the orthodox rule the ruling
of the judge will have some effect upon the jury, it is better that the sole decision
on competency be given by the jury in their deliberations upon the merits. This
would have the additional effect, whatever the theoretical approach, of com-
pelling the evaluation of evidence, rather than its rejection prior to considera-
tion.
The danger behind this solution is the ready opportunity for evidence of a
witness to go to the jury, though a useful by-product of the incompetence based
on interest has always been the incidental protection of relationship, as, for
example, that between husband and wife. Since such protection in each case is a
policy matter, it seems clear that competence should be replaced by privilege.
This has been the marked attitude of English law for over a century, during
which time the common law barriers, based upon mental incapacity and interest,
have been progressively lifted by legislation. However, statutory language has
resulted in confusion, since the legislature has not made the extent of privilege
clear, both in Acts concerning civil and criminal competence. There is here some
support for Professor Morgan's case that the reasons for, and hence the extent of,
the exclusion of relevant evidence are rarely crystal clear. When replacing in-
competence with non-compellability, one would think that the legislature would
have faced the form and extent of privilege four square.8
To replace incompetence with non-compellability may be but to worsen the
problems of the adversary system. On the other hand it does serve to heighten
7 Ibid.
8 See Shenton v. Tyler, Ch. 271 (1938) and 620 (1939), where the court equally lacked
constructive ingenuity.
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the need for a sound justification in the event of the exclusion of any relevant
evidence on the grounds of policy. If a particular privilege becomes indefensible,
then it can be legislatively rejected without jeopardizing the entire distinction
between the function of judge and jury. Of course Professor Morgan agrees that
if privileges are worth retaining, then the orthodox rule should remain in such
cases. His argument for jury consideration of the competency question extends,
however, to all circumstances in which the operation of the exclusionary rules
involves a preliminary determination of the facts in issue. Insofar as policy
does not require total exclusion of evidence, it does seem arguable that the
competency issue should be left to the jury.
The second half of the work is devoted to an examination of the hearsay rule.
In a style both clear and pungent the author levels a severe and crippling blow
at the rationale and workings of this rule. He surveys the history of the rule,
and shows the extraordinary fashion in which the rule was conceived, kept alive
and finally renovated in its old age. An analysis of the present-day application
of the rule is summed up in two sentences:
This wearisome review of the authorities seems to me to constitute a clear demon-
stration that our modem courts in dealing with hearsay, while giving lip service to the
reasons which impelled their predecessors to create the rule, have in fact entirely dis-
regarded them. The oath and opportunity for cross-examination... do not save the
utterance from exclusion as hearsay; the absence of both does not require its exclusion
[p. 166].
Concentration on the oath and cross-examination, Morgan argues, has caused
us to misconceive the limits of their value, and to assume a "naive credulity"
in jurors. To conclude, the author presents a fictitious case where the effect of
the rule and its exceptions is that all evidence from witnesses who observed an
accident is excluded, and only indirect evidence in various unreliable forms is
admitted. Students of the hearsay rule should make a close examination of this
brilliantly exposed case.
Professor Morgan asserts that much hearsay slips in through sheer lack of
appreciation of the character of the proffered evidence.' One of the difficulties
arises from a failure to define terms adequately. Res gestae is the classic ex-
ample. The controversy over Professor Stone's analysis of the term0 directs
the mind to the necessity for a correct interpretation in each case of the facts
in issue, and the facts relevant thereto. Professor Morgan's own analysis"
demonstrates the fine line between evidence admitted as res gestae and evidence
rejected under the hearsay rule. From both of these authorities it is apparent
that ultimate clarification requires careful use, if not avoidance of the term
9 Cross, The Scope of the Rule Against Hearsay, 72 L. Q. R. 91 (1956).
10 Stone, Res Gesta Reagitata, 55 L. Q. R. 66 (1939).
" Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale
L. J. 229 (1922).
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res gestae. Only by so doing can the extent of the hearsay exception in any way
be assessed.
The problem is well illustrated by Teper v. Regina,12 a recent decision of the
judicial Committee of the Privy Council on an appeal from a shopkeeper's
conviction for arson. The issue was the propriety of the trial court's action in
allowing a police constable to testify to an incident which happened not less
than twenty-six minutes after the fire started. just prior to seeing a man re-
sembling the appellant coming from the direction of the fire, he had heard a
cry of fire, and a woman's voice shouting, "Your place burning and you going
away from the fire." Lord Normand, who delivered the judgment, held that
hearsay words forming part of the res gestae are admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule upon the fulfillment of two requirements which form the reason
for the exception: (1) the human utterance is both fact and form of expression,
and (2) human action may be so interwoven with words that the significance
of the action cannot be understood without the correlative words so that their
dissociation would impede the discovery of the truth. Further, he said, hearsay
words, if not absolutely contemporaneous with the act, must be so closely as-
sociated with the act as to be part of the thing being done, and thus an item or
part of real evidence, and not merely a reported statement. The conviction was
reversed, since the statements admitted lacked the requisite contemporaneity.
This contemporaneity umbrella merely confuses relevance and admissibility,
and this confusion may in turn have prevented the court from construing how
far the statement might have secured admission under other exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Res gestae includes acts and words. The words may be of two types.
First, those admitted to show the fact of utterance, which have nothing to do
with hearsay since the fact of their having been made is capable of the sense
perception of the witness, who is under oath and subject to cross-examination.
Second, those admitted to show the truth of their content. These are hearsay,
and admissible only under one of the exceptions. But Lord Normand made
no effort to discuss whether the declaration in question sought admittance for
truth of content or fact of statement. He merely said that the declaration must
be so much a part of the act as to be part of the res gestae. By making the con-
temporaneity requirement of decisive significance he was classifying all res gestae
as hearsay material, and ignoring the possibility that the statements may have
been offered for the fact of statement, in which case the degree of contempo-
raneity would be of significance in assessing the statement's relevance, not its
admissibility.
That the statements in Teper v. Regina were probably offered for the truth of
their contents, since their probative value if offered for the fact of statement
would have been rather slight, does not detract from the court's oversight in
failing to discriminate carefully between the two different kinds of res gestae
12 A.C. 480 (1952).
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words, and is consequent by a misuse of the contemporaneity requirement.
The desire to define within the field of evidence occasionally meets with the
condemnation of practitioners. Academicians are accused of wrongly approach-
ing a subject which requires common sense and on-the-spot decisions. An Eng-
lish lawyer therefore has reason to welcome Professor Morgan's Carpentier
Lectures, culminating with the stimulating hypothetical case on hearsay. He
will also find satisfaction in assuredly sharing this enthusiasm with his Ameri-
can colleagues.
DONOVAN WATERS*
* Assistant Lecturer in Law, University College, London.
A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law. By F. H. Lawson. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Law School, 1955. Pp. xvii, 238. $4.00.
Describing his aims, Professor Lawson writes in his conclusion: "I hope I
have succeeded in what I proposed to do, to introduce you to this very different
world of the Civil Law, and to show you that the leading differences between it
and the Common Law world are not differences of method or in the ways of
handling source materials, but in the concepts themselves; and again that, al-
though the concepts often differ in their general character, the most significant
difference lies just in the simple fact that the two sets of concepts are not the
same" (p. 209). This statement of purpose and conviction suggests several
observations about the excellent book here under review.
Although A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law is useful reading for a
student beginning the comparative study of continental legal systems, the
book's greatest value is not to the beginner. A truly introductory work needs
more institutional detail and probably ought to be pitched on a lower level of
sophistication. The basic problem to which the book addresses itself is of ex-
treme difficulty-are the differences today found between the civil and the
common law systems essentially the product of economic and social conditions
or are they rather more to be explained in terms of the intellectual apparatus
and stock of conceptions through which these systems have perceived and
ordered reality? The book's great merit is its discussion of the role of concepts in
shaping the common and civil laws that we know today.
Concepts shape a body of law in at least two ways. In the first place, concepts
and the form in which they are set out have profound implications for a system's
general thinking habits. Secondly, concepts and the distinctions they embody
suggest certain results and render others, fitting less comfortably in the over-all
pattern of analysis, less likely, quite without regard to the particular functional
problem to be solved. Professor Lawson illuminates both of these matters.
Many differences between legal thinking on the Continent and in the com-
mon-law world are, in some measure, due to the relatively early concern of
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